期刊刊名：管理科學與統計決策 　 卷期：7卷3期

篇名出版日期：2010年9月1日

作者：Cheng-Shou Lu

語言：English

關鍵字：Initial public offerings, Underpricing, Signaling

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摘要：
The empirical evidence supports the signaling theory is still controversial and shows that a pooling equilibrium exists as the low-quality IPOs imitate the pricing strategy of the high-quality ones. The major assumption is that the market will impose a penalty on the issuers who do not signal their true type. This result shows that the type of market equilibrium is related to the existence of the penalty cost. With a costly mechanism, the model demonstrates that a separating equilibrium exists. That is, the offering price of the high-quality IPOs will be lower than that of the low-quality IPOs. Without a costly mechanism, a pooling equilibrium exists as both types of issuers sell shares at the same offering price.

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