

打蘇聯牌 甘迺迪政府對中蘇共分裂政策的分析

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【摘要】

甘迺迪政府時期，中蘇共於第三世界競逐影響力。蘇共領袖赫魯雪夫面臨國內要求增加軍費開支，以及中共批評他對西方過於軟弱的雙重壓力；中共並且無視於赫魯雪夫提供核子傘保護的承諾，推動自身的核武計畫。中蘇共之間的緊張關係迅速升高為雙方敵對性的言辭交鋒，進而引發邊境衝突。

由於不確定中蘇共磨擦的程度與持久性，甘迺迪政府最初對中蘇共之間的齟齬採取謹慎的因應態度，並未尋求與莫斯科結盟。然而在 1961 年底，美方各種情報顯示中蘇共分裂程度加深，復以甘迺迪政府於當年感恩節的人事改組，使得認定中蘇共分裂升高的官員影響力大增。中印邊界戰爭及古巴飛彈危機後，甘迺迪政府確定中蘇共分裂的持久性。至 1963 年，甘迺迪本人確信中蘇共的緊張意味國際共產主義運動已產生分裂，因而甘迺迪政府開始操弄戰略三角賽局，希望藉由有限核試條約來防止蘇聯將核武技術提供給中共，透過此方式，美國進一步有效地離間了中蘇共。

關鍵詞：甘迺迪政府；中蘇共分裂；戰略三角；決策模型

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I. Models and Hypotheses

President Kennedy began his administration with open conflict with the USSR and apparent readiness to open the process of rapprochement with PRC. After three years, however, the converse had occurred. He did not deviate from Eisenhower' policy of opposing China's representation in the United Nations and signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) with the Soviet Union. The Kennedy administration even thought of an US-USSR joint attack on Communist China's nuclear project.

Why did Kennedy choose this course? What was the Kennedy administration's attitude and policy toward of the Sino-Soviet split? Why did Kennedy decide to sign LTBT with the Soviet Union? I will try to answer these questions by using historical evidence and theoretical models.

In assessing the different policy considerations that forced the administration to re-examine the future course of U.S. foreign policy, this study documents the diverging viewpoints of Kennedy and his advisers as well as governmental agencies that influenced the U.S. posture with regard to Beijing and Moscow. Based on archival materials recently declassified and made available by the National Archives and the John F. Kennedy presidential library, this article offers insights into a period that has heretofore been examined by information found only in the public record, unclassified "official" documents, and the personal papers of the Kennedy administration officials. The information and assessments presented in this study aim to impart new perspectives on the Kennedy administration's approach

to the Sino-Soviet split.

The episode is scrutinized by two rival models of decision-making, the rational actor model and the bureaucratic politics model. The rational actor model rest upon the assumptions that decision makers as economical and rational individuals, will be able to identify and rank objectives, goals and values, obtain all relevant information, systematically estimate and consider the expected values of all possible alternatives, and ultimately choose the alternative which will potentially maximize net gains.¹ It is quite possible that decision-makers may systematically estimate and consider the expected values of all possible alternatives and ultimately reach the conclusion that all alternatives are unacceptable and will engender losses rather than maximize gains. In cases such as these, the decision-maker may decide to choose another option which we could define as either “all of the above” (ambiguity) or “none of the above” (ambiguity).

In some case, the optimal or rational choice may be to simply postpone making a decision. According to Janis and Mann, “postponing a decision because of hesitation to take un-specifiable risks sometimes allows the decision-maker to await new events that may change the balance sheet and lead to a more satisfactory solution.”² Janis and Mann call this “constructive procrastination,” while Alexander George refers to it as “calculated” or “rational”

¹ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), and William Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

² Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 239.

procrastination.³

From the rational actor perspective, U.S. would presumably select the policy that would maximize net gains. Two hypotheses are suggested: **Hypothesis A1:** The Kennedy administration would define its foreign policies according to shifting strategic balance of power while maximizing other foreign policy interests. **Hypothesis A2:** Soviet Union's and China's positions can influence the Kennedy administration's decision makers' perception and calculation of the U.S. interests and policy objectives, hence the Kennedy administration's policy outcome.

The bureaucratic politics model interprets decision-making not as the consequence of rational, value-maximizing calculations, but rather as the result of bargaining among various "players" in a competitive "game" called politics.⁴ The mix of the players will vary, depending upon the issue and the nature of the game. Players do not share a homogeneous conception of national interest or security but differ perceptibly in their views of national security, organization interests, domestic interests, and personal interests. In short, a player's stand on an issue is largely determined by how its resolution will affect both his personal and organizational interests; or as Allison put it, "where you stand depends on where you sit."⁵

According to the bureaucratic politics model, decisions are the result of "pulling and hauling" and coalition building among players.⁶

³ Alexander George, *Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 35.

⁴ Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 144.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 176.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 144.

As a consequence, a policy will seldom represent the preference of any single individual or organization, but will represent the end-result of much pulling and hauling; an outcome may not be whole-heartedly supported by any of the players and may, in fact, be unrepresentative of anyone's interest. Allison mentions it only in passing, but the end result of the bureaucratic policy making process quite conceivably could be a "no action" decision. Reflecting organizational and personal interests, players may be willing to settle or push for the adoption of no policy or one so ambiguous that no interests are threatened.

In view of explaining the Kennedy administration's decision, two bureaucratic politics hypotheses are suggested: **Hypothesis B1:** The Kennedy administration's foreign policy can be explained and predicted by bureaucratic players' positions and preferences within the bureaucracy and their interactions. **Hypothesis B2:** Incoherent, uncoordinated policy outcomes can be the result of the pulling and hauling of bureaucratic politics, especially when presidential intention and involvement are low.

By comparing the explanatory power of these two models, this study tries to determine which one can offer a better explanation of the Kennedy administration's policy for the Sino-Soviet split.

II. U.S. Probing the Endurance of the Sino-Soviet Rift

When the Kennedy team came to power, they already considered

Communist China a more unmanageable international actor than the Soviet Union. The new administration was ready to ponder the possibility of inciting Moscow to join hand against the Chinese menace. The collective “state of mind” was attributable to the Korean War experience and the radical policies Beijing had assumed between 1958 and 1960.

The first half of 1960 witnessed a perpetuation of this trend to distinguish between a “fanatical” Beijing and a more “civilized” Moscow. Among its prominent champions were not only president Kennedy and Secretary of States, Dean Rusk, but also Under Secretary of States, Chester Bowles and United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson.⁷ Many of Kennedy’s aides went a step further and toyed with the notion of “exploiting”⁸ Sino-Soviet differences.

By mid-1961, Walt W. Rostow, Roger Hilsman, and even Rusk, however, did not rule out the alternative interpretation — of a Chinese leadership privately debating the merits of a more accommodationist line. Senator Fulbright, for example, questioned the premise that China constituted a more reprehensible international maverick than the Soviet Union. And yet, this crosscurrent was soon submerged by the dominant image of an irrevocably predatory China.⁹

⁷ Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), 218-9; Rusk BBC interview, “United States Foreign Policy in a Period of Change,” March 6, 1961, Department of State Bulletin (hereafter “DSB”), 44, March 27, 1961, 440.

⁸ Memo, Komer to Bundy, “Timing of a Basic Policy Review,” April 4, 1961, National Security File (hereafter “NSF”), M&M, box 321, Komer, 4/1/61-4/16/61, John F. Kennedy Library (hereafter “JFKL”).

⁹ Telegram 668, Hong Kong to Department of State (hereafter “DOS”), December 21, 1961, James C. Thomas (hereafter “JCT”) Papers, box 15, Food For China 1961; Fulbright remarks, “Relations with China (Mark-Up),” July 14, 1961, *Executive Sessions* 13:2 (1961), 389.

During 1961 the administration generally refrained from playing the strategic triangular game, because the intelligence community registered an ambivalent record concerning the split. On one hand, it scored a success at charting the deepening rupture, certainly in comparison to detecting events within China. On the other, the community shied away from ascribing permanence to the rift.

The combination of a Sino-Soviet task force within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and decision-makers' interest in the subject evidently helped to produce a handsome yield.¹⁰ Intelligence reports were well appraised of milestones in the Communist powers' estrangement. The altercation between Khrushchev and his Chinese hosts in October 1959; the eruption of open ideological crossfire initiated by Beijing in April 1960; and the duel at the Rumanian Party Congress in late June of that year were all quickly detected. Most significantly, the intelligence community amplified the mid-1960 departure of Soviet technicians. The most incisive report of the period, the CIA Task Forces' "The Sino-Soviet Dispute and its significance," demonstrated further acumen in believing that "the problem of nuclear weapons for China is one of the most divisive issues in Sino-Soviet relations" although the evidence is "too fragmentary to support this judgment with confidence."¹¹

Intelligence reports identified some of the most fundamental sources of Sino-Soviet discord, including the long history of dissonant

¹⁰ The Sino-Soviet task force was established in the mid-1950 at the instigation of Ray Cline, who headed the force until his departure for Taipei in 1958. For Kennedy's early determination to follow the issue closely, Memo, Charles Bohlen to Bundy, "Sino-Soviet Dispute," February 16, 1961, Presidents Office Files (hereafter POF), box 106, Sino-Soviet Dispute, JFKL.

¹¹ CIA, Sino-Soviet Task Force, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Its Significance," April 1, 1961, in Paul Kesaris, ed., *CIA Research Reports: China, 1946-1976* (Frederick, MD.: 1982, Microfilm), 6, fn.

Russian-Chinese relations, Stalin's reluctance to assist the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through 1949, the weight of nationalistic fervor on both sides, the personality clash between Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev, and the row over nuclear "partnership." Further, the Chinese claim to ideological purity was correctly appraised as presenting a challenge to both the legitimacy of the present Soviet leadership, and Russian primacy within the Communist "bloc." Intelligence officers realized that this Chinese unwillingness to toe the Soviet line and aspirations to genuine partnership was more than Khrushchev could stomach. It constituted a chief impediment to compromise. Finally, the very first reports on the subject Kennedy received already attributed the "present crisis in the alliance basically to the difference as to the correct strategy to be pursued in the World Communist Struggle."¹² These reports reminded the decision-makers that Mao, celebrating the alleged prevalence of the "East Wind" over the "West Wind," resented the doctrine of peaceful coexistence preached and executed by Khrushchev. As filtered through Washington, the helmsman inspired the Chinese leadership to debate the scenario of peaceful transition to socialism and chant the inevitability of war. The Sino-Soviet Task Force keenly asserted that Khrushchev's newly-found "hard-line" on war of National Liberation was principally a product of the split and was designed to avoid being outflanked on the Left by the Chinese.¹³

Despite collecting such compelling indicators of the controversy's depth, the intelligence officers were slow to declare the

¹² "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies," December 1, 1960, National Archives (hereafter "NA"), RG 263, box 2, National Intelligence Estimates (hereafter "NIE"), Concerning Soviet Military Power, 1950-1984.

¹³ "The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Its Significance," April 1, 1961, Kesaris, ed., *CIA Research Reports: China, 1946-1976*.

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Sino-Soviet link irreparable. They held that mutual Sino-Soviet awareness of the heavy damage to both the national interest and the communist cause. Accordingly, the standard forecast predicted neither a fundamental reconciliation of differences, nor an open break, but rather ebbing and flowing discord. Even “The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Its Significance,” ultimately reiterated the conventional and cautious prediction.¹⁴

The lack of consensus as to the nature of bloc divisions existed on all corners of government. Since the CIA had fallen into some disrepute with policymakers consequent to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, this should probably be attributed less to the direct impact of intelligence reports and more the individual proclivities of the decision-makers.¹⁵ Ambassador to Moscow Llewellyn E. Thomson and Special Assistant to the Secretary of States Charles E. Bohlen supported the “Sino-Soviet Dispute and Its Significance” in their well-informed and deft deciphering of the Sino-Soviet puzzle.¹⁶ Edward Rice, by contrast, as late as October suggested that the Western camp was more elementally fragmented than its Communist counterpart. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were similarly inclined. In June, Paul Nitze, member of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), disclosed to the Senate Foreign

¹⁴ NIE 10-61, “Authority and Control in the Communist Movement,” August 10, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 117; SNIE 13-2-61, “Communist China in 1971,” September 28, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 140.

¹⁵ Carl M. Brauer, “John F. Kennedy: the Endurance of Inspirational Leadership,” in Fred I. Greenstein, ed., *Leadership in the Modern Presidency* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 130-1; Rhodri Jeffryes-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1976), 122-8, 36-7.

¹⁶ L. Thomson testimony, February 13, 1961, *Executive Session*, no. 13:1 (1961): 137, 47, 59.; Embtel, L. Thomson to DOS, May 27, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 14, *Berlin Crisis, 1961-1963* (1994), 76-7; memo, Bohlen to Bundy, February 16, 1961, “Sino-Soviet Dispute,” February 16, 1961, POF, box 106, Sino-Soviet Dispute, JFKL.

Relations Committee that he was unclear whether the split was genuine or a sham, a “one-two punch on [the Soviet and Chinese] side.”¹⁷

Both the President and Rusk were torn between these contradictory impulses. That Rusk still doubted that the Sino-Soviet strains had exacerbated to the point of affecting the international scene extensively. He questioned whether the West “would have enough time to wait... for any quarrel between the Communist rivals to become serious.”¹⁸ At this stage, uncertainty about the split indeed permeated all the levels of the administration.

III. From Hesitating to New Policy Assessment and Initiative

The Kennedy administration’s position through mid-1962 was the conscious decision to “adopt a circumscribed attitude in public toward the troubles in the Communist world and make no overt efforts to exploit the rift,”¹⁹ In one representative comment, for instance, Kennedy said it was not “useful... to attempt to assess” the significance to the West of Sino-Soviet strains.²⁰

¹⁷ Paul Nitze testimony before the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 8, 1961, *Executive Sessions*, 13:2 (1961), 74; Rice, “US policy toward China,” October 26, 1961, 11, JCT Papers, box 14, S/P-61159: US Policy towards China, 10/26/61; memo, JCS to McNamara, March 23, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 7, *Arms Control and Disarmament* (1995), 22-3.

¹⁸ Memocon, JFK-De Gaulle, May 31, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 24, 220.

¹⁹ Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972*, 221.

²⁰ Kennedy Press Conference, November 8, 1961, Public Paper of the President (hereafter “PPP”.) 705.

In part, tactical considerations prompted that decision. Policy formulators aptly observed that conspicuous meddling in the intra-Communist controversy ran the twin risks of triggering a Sino-Soviet duel for the badge of ideological purity, and inciting the Communist giants to patch up their differences. In fact, the State Department asserted that Chinese pressure had already caused Khrushchev to become more militant.²¹

As 1962 progressed, in the wake of Sino-Soviet fissures gradually gave way to the “second phase” in the administration’s handling of the matter. Lasting through Sino-Indian war, decision-makers in Washington got greater conviction that the wedge in the Communist world was real and substantive. This spurred a three-way debate between the support of “carrot and stick,” a “pressure-wedge” strategy, and those who found the notion of American manipulation of the split altogether futile, or even unavoidably ill-fated. The bureaucratic reshuffle at the end of 1961 gave impetus to a Chinese policy reassessment. The Sino-Soviet policy sphere was no exception. Against the backdrop of conspicuous Sino-Soviet acrimony, a number of China-watching experts and think tanks proclaimed the fissures unbridgeable.

The Policy Planning Council (PPC) led the way. On December 19, 1961, a draft, which prepared by Mose L. Harvey signaled the transition to the “second phase.”²² The draft declared that the Sino-Soviet conflict had reached a “critical stage,” that the basic issue

²¹ Memcon, Kennedy-Macmillan, April 6, 1961, DOS, *FRUS, 1960-1963*, vol. 14, 14, 41; Rusk circular Telegram to Embassy in France, April 8, 1961, DOS, *FRUS, 1960-1963*, vol. 13, *Western Europe and Canada* (1994), 1038-9.

²² James C. Thomson stressed this point in 1972. See James C. Thomson, “On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics,” *China Quarterly* 50 (1972).

was one of supremacy within the Communist camp, and that its ultimate source lay not in the ideological realm but in a clash of national interests. The Communist adversaries conceived of the dispute in zero-sum terms: [each side] has “moved steadily toward a no-holds-barred trial of strength... Acrimony, bitterness, backbiting, distortion, hostility, all have come to mark the attitude and conduct of both.” The Council consequently deemed the rift likely to continue, perhaps until there was a “decisive break’ in the world Communist movement. On China policy, the paper communicated a rather reassuring message. It argues that Moscow had badgered the Chinese into explaining that they do not favor actions designed to precipitate war, and had given Beijing clear warning that an adventurous course would not get Moscow’s support. The paper predicted that Beijing would avoid embarking on any adventures that would involve a direct threat to US interests and positions.²³

On January 2, 1962, the paper created quite a stir at the Department’s Policy Planning Meeting. James Thomson may be overstating the case in arguing that the meeting affected the “belated percolation of [the reality of Sino-Soviet rivalry] to the upper reaches of State.”²⁴ Rusk had been contemplating this issue for a very long time. However, the occasion was a landmark one. Rusk termed the PPC paper a highly important document. As Rosemary Foot puts it, the discussants made “serious attempts... to categorize the nature of the rift, and, in a way that was more explicit than in the past, to assess

²³ Policy Planning Council (hereafter “S/P”), Department of State, Policy Planning Council paper, “The Sino-Soviet Conflict and U.S. Policy,” December 19, 1961, JCT Papers, box 14, Policy Planning Council paper, Sino-Soviet Conflict and U.S. Policy, April 30, 1962, JFKL. See also *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 176, fn. 2.

²⁴ Thomson, “On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics,” 228.

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what the breach meant for... US policies.”²⁵ Two clusters of opinion emerged. Rusk tended toward the ostracizing of Beijing. Rostow, on the other hand, proposed that the split bred factionalism within the Chinese ruling circle, presumed it would probably become crucial in the event of Mao’s death, and broached the alternative of giving the less belligerently inclined “a vision of the possibility of better relations with us if they calm down.”²⁶

As early as November 1961, Rostow accentuated that the Sino-Soviet rift had reached the point of no return in a ringing plea to the President:

I believe it possible that, despite Chicom verbal toughness, [the Chinese leaders] are in such trouble at home and in such an impossible position with respect to Moscow that they may be seeking a limited accommodation with the West... the evidence isn't good enough. But if I'm right, this may be the hinge on which your administration will turn.²⁷

In the following months, Rowtow’s idea swept away traces of doubt. By February 1962, Rostow asserted that the domestic political obstacles to lifting the China trade ban — such as Chinese Nationalist protestations and China Lobby pressure — could be overcome, provided that the Chinese authorities would commit themselves to a “change in attitude and conduct.” However, most of the people he

²⁵ Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 176.

²⁶ Thomson to Harriman, January 12, 1961, DOS, *FRUS, 1960-1963*, vol. 22, 176-9. The quote is from p. 178.

²⁷ Rostow to Kennedy, “A memo for the thanksgiving weekend,” November 22, 1961, NSF, box 22, China, General, 11/1/61-11/26/61, JFKL.

discussed with had different opinions.²⁸

Rostow presented a grand design to Rusk. Its premise was that “there is no longer much chance of a fundamental resolution of [Sino-Soviet] differences. In [the PPS] view, the chances that such a split can be avoided in 1962 are no better than even.” American planning should be predicated on this assumption; this epitome of “New Frontier” boldness visualized a “carrot and stick” approach toward both the Soviet and China. Rostow and his supporters seriously implied the feasibility of improving relations with both Communist countries.²⁹

Rostow recommended: (a) psychological exploitation of the dispute through the dissemination of information concerning its development; (b) an increase in official U.S. attention to the dispute; (c) negotiations with the Soviet Union with the objective of finding and capitalizing on areas of overlapping interest; (d) declarations and concrete military measures to make it clear to the Chinese Communist that aggressive communist actions would be countered resolutely and effectively; (e) efforts to open new lines of communication to Communist China and to offer it opportunities, possibly including grain sales, “to secure benefits from better relations with us in exchange for modifications in its behavior,” and (f) considerations of the desirability of seeking Chinese participation in disarmament negotiations.³⁰

²⁸ Memo, Rostow, “Thursday, February 20 Planning Group Meeting at 12 Noon,” February 16, 1962, NSF, box 22, China, General, 1/62-3-62, JFKL.

²⁹ This somewhat modifies Cordon Chang’s assertion that Kennedy (and Johnson) administration never contemplated such a possibility seriously. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972*, 252.

³⁰ Paper, Rostow to Rusk, “U.S. Policy Re the Sino-Soviet Conflict,” April 2, 1962, as summarized in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 207-8.

Rusk approved some parts of recommendations (a) and (b). Hesitating on the other recommendation, he canvassed official opinion on both Rostow's idea and the prognosis for Sino-Soviet relations. The feedback to Rusk's query revealed that official Washington was not yet agreed on the notion of a pending Sino-Soviet break that was susceptible to American exploitation:

First, Rostow's anticipation of an imminent 'break' was obviously made in consultation with leading CIA analysts. The burden of CIA's concurrent reports was that China's leaders had demonstrated a determination to stand firm even in the face of considerable pressure exerted by Moscow. They asserted that Sino-Soviet relations were in a critical phase just short of an acknowledged and definitive split. A report concluded that "if there is no change in the leadership of either party before mid-1963, we think that a Sino-Soviet break [by that time]... is more likely than not."³¹ Both James Thoms on and Bowles shared that opinion.³²

Second, a number of prominent Foreign Service "Russian expert," deemed Rostow's prognosis too optimistic. Most extreme of this lot was George Kennan. By January 1962, he was still confident that the communist giants could not possibly overcome their divisions.³³ Then rumors about an imminent thaw between Moscow and Beijing may have nudged him toward a reappraisal. To his mind, Khrushchev's frustration over establishing "peaceful coexistence"

³¹ CIA paper, "Prospects for the Sino-Soviet Relationship," February 20, 1962, JCT Papers, box 15, Prospects for the Sino-Soviet Relationship. For a similar report, see National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-62, "Political Developments in the USSR and the Communist World," February 21, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 5.

³² Donald S. Zagoria, "The Future of Sino-Soviet Relations," JCT Papers, box 14, Communist China General 1/61-6/61.

³³ Kennan testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 11, 1962, *Executive Sessions*, vol. 14 (1962), 25.

with the West combined with the sobering Chinese experience with the Great Leap Forward to inflict a greater modesty of aspirations on both sides. He asserted both countries would further reduce the antagonists to “repress their differences and carry on.”³⁴ Both Charles Bohlen and Llewellyn Thomson pointed out the possibility that Khrushchev was seeking to disarm his Kremlin rivals through temporary accommodations to Chinese policy. They believed, however, that any such ease of tensions would be short-lived, due to the fundamental nature of the sources of friction.³⁵

During the “second stage”, the Kennedy administration failed to chart a concerted approach to the Sino-Soviet question. The PPC paper of December 1961 produced some broader grasp of the origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Further, intensive reflection brought most of the decision-makers to the brink of acknowledging the split’s endurance. But vivid debates over both the timetable for a break and the implications for United States policy handicapped consistency and coordination. These debates not only split Washington, but also split the minds of many ranking officials who witnessed Kennan’s above-mentioned volatility on the prospects of a “break,” or the various about-face of both Rusk and Harriman on the food relief issue.³⁶

³⁴ #636 Kennan dispatch from Belgrade, April 11, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 230.

³⁵ Memo, Bohlen to Bundy, May 25, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 230; # 3070 Embtel, L. Thomson to DOS, 26 May 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, 231; #1981 Embtel, L. Thomson to DOS, 18 January 1962, NSF, box 178, USSR, General, vol. 4, JFKL.

³⁶ Thomson memo, January 12, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 176; draft memo, Rusk to Kennedy, “United States Policy on Shipments of Medicine and Food Grains to Communist China,” April 4, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 208-11; Paper prepared at State, “Food Grains for Mainland China,” May 28, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 231-3. For Harriman, Memo Harriman to Rusk, “United States Policy on Shipments of Medicines and Food Grains to Communist China,” April 13, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 216-7.

Kennedy and Rusk evidently felt further constrained by the eruption of a sometimes excited public controversy over the Sino-Soviet rift, its permanence and policy consequences for the United States. The approaching mid-term Congressional elections obviously rendered them all the more sensitive to the domestic arena.

Another complicated factor was the administration's concern about Khrushchev. During 1962 a second round of friction over Berlin consumed much of Kennedy's attention. That issue also accentuated his doubts as far as collaborating with Moscow was concerned. In February 1962, he told Congressional leaders, "we are not convinced that the Soviets themselves are sure of what course of action they are going to follow [with regard to Berlin].... We just don't know."³⁷

IV. U.S. Concerning of PRC's Nuclear Project and Thinking of Playing the Soviet Card

In late 1962, just before the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy became increasingly concerned about Communist China's atomic weapons program. After the Missile Crisis, he told congressional leader that "we've won a great victory, there is no threat any more from Russia. The threat in the years ahead is China."³⁸ While it is true that U.S. relations with the PRC had been tense since the Korean War, once the 1953 settlement had been negotiated, the relationship with

³⁷ Quoted in Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1997), 32-3.

³⁸ John Newhouse, *War and Peace in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 197.

Communist China might have just as easily been improved as allowed to deteriorate. Kennedy was in a unique position to take a more positive stance, but the evidence suggests that Communist China's nuclear development deeply disturbed him.

The President's growing concern regarding the potential of Chinese nuclear capability was evident as Kennedy addressed the National Security Council (NSC) on January 23, 1963, and emphasized that "[a]ny negotiations that can hold back the Chinese Communist are most important ... because they loom as our major antagonists of the late 60's and beyond."³⁹ In response to the President's remarks to the NSC, Harriman wrote to Kennedy in support of the President's assessment that the most important issue in view of U.S. security was to prevent Communist China from gaining nuclear capability and to determine how the United States could join forces with the Soviet Union to this end.⁴⁰ Although there was no indications that the Soviet Union would engage in a joint effort with the United States to prevent Communist China's acquisition of nuclear capability, Harriman relayed that the Russians had suggested an international test ban agreement might be an effective deterrent against Communist China's nuclear development as "world opinion would prevent China from acting independently." Harriman suspected that the Kremlin envisioned a combined effort through a test ban agreement which would not only hamper Communist China's nuclear development but more significantly would add to Beijing's political isolation.

³⁹ Memo of Conversation, January 22, 1963, DOS, Central Files, 711.5/1 -2263.FRUS, vol. 22, 341.

⁴⁰ Memo, W. Averell Harriman to John F. Kennedy, January 23, 1963, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, Subject Files, John F. Kennedy. FRUS, vol. 22, 341.

Kennedy's concerns about the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Communist China were not shared by all officials in his administration. The director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Roger Hilsman, commented in 1962 that the possession of nuclear weapons by Communist China would not change the balance of power in Asia, let alone the World. General Maxwell Taylor, Kennedy's major military advisor, said that he saw no evidence that the Chinese Communist believe they would gain from a nuclear war — a rhetorical accusation made by both Kennedy and Khrushchev over the years.⁴¹

Nevertheless, Kennedy and his major advisors still sought to use the quest for a nuclear test ban as way of hampering Communist China's nuclear program and dividing the Soviet Union from its former ally. Negotiations on an atmospheric nuclear test ban treaty involving France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union began in 1963. Presenting the case for an agreement to French President Charles De Gaulle, Kennedy warned that a nuclear China threatened to be a "great menace in the future to humanity, the free world, and freedom on earth."⁴² In January 1963 Kennedy told Andre Malraux, the French Minister of Culture then visiting the United States to present the Louvre's *Mona Lisa* for exhibition, that China could not be treated in the same way as the Soviet Union because "...the Chinese would be perfectly prepared to sacrifice hundred of millions of their own lives, if this were necessary in order to carry out their militant and aggressive policies."⁴³ Although unsuccessful in achieving French support, Kennedy was able to reach agreement with Great Britain and

⁴¹ Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, 238.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 236.

⁴³ Gerald Segal, *The Great Power Triangle* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 66.

the Soviet Union.

In July 1963, representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain met in Moscow for negotiations regarding a test ban treaty. On July 25, the three nations initialed a treaty that banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. At these talks, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, W. Averell Harriman, representing the United States hoped to request Soviet assistance in restraining Chinese nuclear development. On July 15 after Harriman's initial meeting with Khrushchev, Kennedy sent a message to Harriman in Moscow reiterating his concern regarding Chinese Communist acquisition of nuclear weaponry. The President conveyed his feeling that "the Chinese problem is more serious than Khrushchev comments in first meeting suggest," and subsequently instructed Harriman to press the question with the Soviet leader in a private meeting. Kennedy was convinced that even "relatively small forces in the hands of people like ChiComs could be very dangerous to us all."⁴⁴ Later documentation of the test ban treaty negotiations in Moscow, dated October 2, 1964, revealed that there was no formal record of Harriman requesting a joint U.S.-USSR effort to retard Communist China's nuclear weapons development.⁴⁵ Although the topic of Chinese nuclear capability was discussed, it was later documented that "Khrushchev was obviously unwilling to talk at much length on the question and he tried to give the impression of not being greatly concerned."⁴⁶ This would coincide with Harriman's

⁴⁴ Letter, John F. Kennedy to W. Averell Harriman, July 15, 1963, DOS, Central Files, DEF 18-4, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 370.

⁴⁵ Memo, John J. de Martino to Benjamin H. Read, October 2, 1964, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers; Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, Trips and Missions, Test Ban Treaty, Background, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 371.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

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theory that Khrushchev's interest in the test ban treaty stemmed primarily from the latter's desire to further isolate Communist China in the international community. In terms of directly deterring Communist Chinese nuclear development, however, it did not appear that Khrushchev was interested in joining forces with the United States.

The prospects of increased militancy by the Chinese Communists were thoroughly discussed with the President and his advisers at the National Security Council meeting in late July 1963. With recent findings in a National Intelligence Estimate as the basis of discussion, not all in the State Department supported the idea of continued aggression by the Chinese Communists in the near future. The intelligence community conveyed that with signs of a deepening Sino-Soviet rift and recent Soviet negotiations with the West for the test ban treaty, the Chinese Communists were likely to undertake "somewhat more assertive initiatives" such as "new pressures or incursions on the Indian border and in Laos."⁴⁷ It had been noted in the Estimate, however, that the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State (INR), George C. Denney, Jr., was skeptical of whether the Communist Chinese would pursue initiatives at that time. Meanwhile, Rusk and Harriman fully supported the Estimate's forecasts and made clear that they did not concur with the reservations voiced by Denney. Roger Hilsman, Jr., former INR Director and then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs since April 1963, relayed that Ambassador Cabot in Warsaw would be instructed to warn the Chinese Communists against

⁴⁷ NIE, "Possibility of Greater Militancy by the Chinese Communists," July 31, 1963, DOS, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, SNIE 13-4-63, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 371.

taking actions which would prompt a U.S. response.⁴⁸ Earlier, Hilsman had requested in a memorandum to Rusk that the Department of Defense comment on U.S. military responses to “possible renewal of Chinese Communist militancy on the Indian front,” and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluate the potential for increased infiltration into South Vietnam. Top advisers concurred that Communist China would pursue a more militant and aggressive posture than in the past, if only to demonstrate its ability to survive by its own means without Soviet direction. Forecasts made by the intelligence community reinforced and perpetuated the concerns of the Kennedy administration regarding Communist China’s looming presence in East Asia. Therefore, Rusk advised that the United States should maintain “a state of considerable alert during the next few weeks.” The Secretary of State’s apprehensions regarding Beijing’s potential militancy propelled him to warn that Communist China could suddenly cause “grave trouble” on several fronts. The unpredictability and lack of information regarding the Beijing regime, in Rusk’s eyes, made Communist China an even more dangerous menace to the United States.

In terms of the Sino-Soviet rift, the Secretary of State advised caution since a Chinese initiative might “suddenly reveal that the Russians and the Chinese were back together again.” The Director of the CIA, John A. McCone, added that although the differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China were indeed great, he did not believe that they would result in a final break between the two communist powers. Harriman also concurred, stating that although he did not believe that Khrushchev would support Beijing in

⁴⁸ *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 371.

“any wild adventure” in a situation threatening the very existence of communist rule on the mainland such as a major attack by the Chinese Nationalists, the Soviet Union was sure to come to the support of Communist China.⁴⁹ Thus, top advisers of the Kennedy administration concluded that despite the Sino-Soviet rift, it could not be assumed that possibilities did not exist for reconciliation.

V. Missile Crisis, Sino-Indian War and U.S. Policy Change

Washington fully recognized the irreversibility of the Sino-Soviet split after the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Indian war. To the American mind, these events also worked to reaffirm the distinction between a bellicose Beijing and a more manageable Moscow. Under strategic and domestic calculations, the Kennedy administration more clearly fell on the Soviet side and plunged into the strategic triangular game.

The Sino-Indian border war widened the breach in the Communist world. The Kremlin, which was not consulted by Beijing before launching the border war, found itself forced to make a choice between a formal Communist ally and a friendly and important neutralist actor. The Chinese trumpeted the Soviet straddling as another betrayal of both Communist camaraderie and cause.⁵⁰ The Cuban Missile Crisis lent a sharp edge to the trend. Mutual

⁴⁹ *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 371.

⁵⁰ Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy: Decision-Making in the White House* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), 257.

recriminations reached a new level. Not only did the Chinese level both the charges of “adventurism” and “capitulationism” against the Kremlin, but they also sought to garner the favor of a Castro furious with what he regarded as a Soviet breach of faith. The Soviet replied by tagging the Chinese reckless.⁵¹

The Kennedy administration discerned and appreciated the trend quickly. The CIA and INR caught a glimpse of Moscow’s acute discomfort in the wake of the border war. The Kremlin was so eager to bring the fighting to a halt and welcome a modest amount of Western military aid to India, if this would force Beijing to the negotiating table.⁵²

The intensification of polemics after the Sino-Indian war was even more conspicuous to Americans, as a new round of mutual abuse broke in mid-November 1962.⁵³ Covert information pointed in the same direction. McCone informed Kennedy of an intercepted Chinese note “to the Cuban ambassador in Peiping implying that the U.S.S.R. was an untrustworthy ally, in particular [the Chinese] said that since 1959 Moscow had refused to give China technical information concerning production of nuclear arms.”⁵⁴

The Sino-Indian border war and the Cuban Missile Crisis affected Washington’s stance in another way. They consolidated the

⁵¹ John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 193., Khrushchev letter to Castro, cited in Zubok, “The Soviet Challenge,” in Diane Kunz, ed., *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

⁵² CIA information report, “Comments of Soviet Diplomat on Sino-Indian Conflict and Sino-Soviet relations,” November 29, 1962, NSF: CO, box 108, India, General, 11/28/62-11/29/62, JFKL.

⁵³ See Congressional Quarterly, *China: U.S. Policy since 1945* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1980), 133.

⁵⁴ McCone intelligence briefing, October 29, 1962, in May and Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 637-8.

perceptual distinction between renegade Chinese leadership and a more civilized Kremlin.⁵⁵ The border episode dealt a heavy blow to the notion of a China prudent in practice. One important convert was Rostow, who now became a voice for an adamant “pressure-wedge” strategy.

The missile crisis had extensive impact on Soviet-American relations. Recent revelations confirm that “it was the fact that Khrushchev lied to Kennedy and tried to surprise him [regarding the deployment of the missiles] that made the missile deployments such an excruciating test of Kennedy’s mettle and the credibility of the United States.”⁵⁶ Paradoxically, however, the shared glimpse into the nuclear abyss, and the mutual retreat from the brink, rendered the national security establishments in both countries more eager than ever to prevent direct clashes between the super powers. One result was the opening of a hot-line to back up the confidential channel.⁵⁷ After the missile crisis, the Soviet media reiterated the horrors of nuclear war, reaffirmed Moscow’s commitment to peaceful coexistence, and reproached Beijing for an allegedly irresponsible attitude on that score.

In January 1963, Khrushchev began walking away from his confrontational policy by simply declaring victory. A major roadblock to easing Soviet-American tensions had been removed.⁵⁸ As the prospects for improving relations loomed, Chinese fears of

⁵⁵ This impact of the October events has been widely recognized in the literature. See Warren I. Cohen, *Dean Rusk* (Totowa, N.J.: Cooper Square, 1980), 170; Foot, *The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949*, 98.

⁵⁶ May and Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 667.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 663.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 690.

encirclement were heightened. This led to a more strident rhetorical posture of Chinese leaders. Consequently, the inevitability of war and the degree of desired belligerency vis -à-vis the US became more central and conspicuous points of contention between the PRC and the USSR.⁵⁹

On the American side, a few people still doubted the nature of Sino-Soviet split. During NSC meeting, which attempted to gauge Chinese intentions in July 1963, McCone dubbed Soviet-Chinese differences “very great” but “not enough.”⁶⁰ He obviously believe that United States polices should not be pre-dictated on the premise of an enduring split.⁶¹ McCone’s reputation and credibility had been on the rise since he had anticipated the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba. In this case, however, he failed to prevail in the agency. In a widely circulated CIA memo, “Sino-Soviet Relations at a New Crisis,” of January 1963, Deputy Director of CIA, Ray Cline, stated “a split has already occurred.”⁶² The CIA paper highlighted the contribution of the October 1962 events to the intensification of the rift. Noting the new openness with which each side treated the possibility of a formal rupture, the document cited Chinese accusations of a Soviet “Munich” at Cuba, and Soviet allusions to the imperative of toning down verbal attacks on the West in the wake of the deteriorating relations with China. Cline singled out for the

⁵⁹ R. W. Leopold, *The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History* (New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 1962) 109; Roderick Macfarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, vol. 3: *The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 318-20.

⁶⁰ “Chinese Communist Intentions,” Summary Record of the 516th Meeting of the NSC, July 31, 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 373.

⁶¹ Thomas Hughes, “The Power to Speak and the Power to Listen,” in Thomas M. Frank, *Secrecy and Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 21.

⁶² Cline memo, “Sino-Soviet Relations,” January 14, 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 340; Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972*, 235-6.

policymakers' attention the grim possibility of the "emergence of separate [and more militant] Asian Communist Bloc" under the leadership of China. This concern evidently underscored for Cline the advisability of aligning with Moscow.⁶³

At this juncture, the extent of the Communist feud surfaced more strongly than ever at the Sixth Congress of the East German Communist Party in East Berlin. The balance of opinion in Washington shifted decisively in Cline's favor. At the State Department, Harriman and Hilsman pointed out the role of the October events in exacerbating the split. Harriman more bluntly than ever contrasted Beijing's alleged aggression in India with Soviet "shying away from nuclear conflict as proved in the case of Cuba."⁶⁴ By April, he stated that the image of a monolithic international Communist bloc has always been more of myth than a reflection of reality.⁶⁵ Harriman even expounded the dominant view that Moscow would not acquiesce in an American-Nationalist Chinese attempt to overthrow Communist rule in China.⁶⁶ Predictably, his assessment was made to the Nationalist in crystal-clear terms: "The time when major action against the mainland can be taken without danger of Soviet intervention is not here and may never arrive," Bundy faced an uneasy Chiang Ching-kuo in September in 1963.⁶⁷

⁶³ "Sino-Soviet Relations," January 14, 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 340; CIA Memo, "Sino-Soviet Relations at a New Crisis," January 14, 1963, NSF, box 180, USSR, General, 01/9/63-01/14/63, JFKL.

⁶⁴ Hilsman Address, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute," November 8, 1962, *Department of State Bulletin* 47, November 26, 1962, 807-8; "State Department Briefing: Red China and the USSR," February 11, 1963, *Department of State Bulletin* 48, February 25, 1963, 275.

⁶⁵ Harriman remarks, April 19, 1963, *Department of State Bulletin* 48, May 6, 1963, 692.

⁶⁶ Harriman remarks, April 19, 1963, *Department of State Bulletin* 48, May 6, 1963; Foot, *The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949*, 133.

⁶⁷ "Meeting Between Mr. McGeorgy Bundy and General Chiang Ching-kuo," September 10, 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 385. Ambassador Kirk was especially impatient with Taipei's contrary arguments. See: "Decision Facing United

A related development was that the idea of fostering a moderate leadership faction was temporarily shelved. For Kennedy, the fierce attack on his administration from Beijing for the US support for India, illustrated that there were little chance of Sino -American accommodation in the next few years.

These views and sentiments of Cline and Harriman were embraced by Rusk and Kennedy. Cline, Bundy and Hilsman joined hands in securing the senior officials' attention to the exchange of blows between Moscow and Beijing in the aftermath of the fall 1962 events. They highlighted not only the ideological crossfire over "peaceful coexistence," but also Beijing's unprecedented, and public, suggestions that Moscow unjustly occupied Chinese territory.⁶⁸ Kennedy and Rusk apparently interpreted their own experience with Khrushchev as conclusive proof that Khrushchev had despaired of leveling with the Chinese. The split had gone to the point of no return. Kennedy communicated this judgment to the NSC as early as January 1963. In fact, Kennedy's certainty about the durability of the split had by then matured to the point of reviving his hopes for Soviet agreement to a nuclear test ban treaty, which he prized as an instrument to contain China's nuclear progress.⁶⁹

VI. U.S. Playing the Strategic Triangular Game

States vis-à-vis Chiang Kai-shek," Memo Kirk to Kennedy, March 29, 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, 358.

⁶⁸ "Sino-Soviet Relations," Cline memo, January 14, 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol.22, 340.

⁶⁹ "Mr. Hilsman's Remarks at Director's Meeting," January 22, 1963, RH Papers, box 5, Hilsman Summary of President's views, 22. 1.63. See also *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol.22, 341.

Why the administration shifted to bolder triangular thinking and to a pro-Soviet line? Many reasons deserve attention. As mentioned above, the high-ranking officials' motives were the belief in the endurance of the split. This thought became the conviction at the White House in the wake of the events of the fall of 1962. The intelligence community's projection of a doomed Sino-Soviet bond bore significantly on decision-makers. Compounding this tenet was the image of China as an irredeemable pariah actor, posing threat to the United States. Equipped with these perceptual lenses, Kennedy and his lieutenants obviously felt that since neither Sino-Soviet reconciliation nor Sino-American rapprochement were in the cards, it was safe to take pro-Soviet stance.

The new boldness also reflected a measure of self-satisfaction concerning the role Washington had allegedly played in the making of the Sino-Soviet split. The epitome of this sentiment was McGeorge Bundy. He performed vital functions on the Kennedy team. He was the gatekeeper of information flowing Kennedy's way. May and Zelikow probably best capture the essence of his role at the deliberations phase. Matching Kennedy in quickness of mind and taste of irony, the lucid Bundy was "the clarifier-the person frame[d] in precise language the issue that the President must decide."⁷⁰

When Bundy summarized a July 1963 CIA report for the President in the nearly boastful phrase: "[The Sino-Soviet split] was largely our accomplishment... we can benefit from it," he was pronouncing a notion apparently in vogue in official Washington. He

⁷⁰ May and Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 42.

evidently expected Kennedy to agree.⁷¹

The public illumination of the Chinese threat was prompted by the Democratic conceptualization of the domestic political calculus. To be sure, the China Lobby wielded much less influence than in years past. Consequently, shapers of policy could dismiss as irrelevant the charges that the split was a hoax.

On another level, the evidence suggests that Kennedy and his subordinates were not above fostering an anti-PRC sentiment for perceived domestic gains. The scope for manipulative opportunities in that direction seemingly presented itself to the administration in 1961. Rusk and Fulbright found “the Chinese bogie” useful in their efforts to fend off cuts in the administration’s foreign aid bill.⁷² In the same year, conversely, saw no appreciable public pressure on Kennedy to ease tension with Moscow. Historian Nancy Tucker and political scientist Leonard Kusnitz promote the hypothesis that “during... the post-Cuban missile crisis Kennedy years, the government perceived utility in creating an image of a fearsome, irrational China. Focusing on the importance of public opinion and interest in the making of U.S. foreign policy, [they] both note the advantage such perceptions had for explaining efforts to improve relations with the Soviets. Washington’s vigilance on the China front satisfied much of the emotional xenophobia abroad in the land, allowing Washington freedom to seek working relations with [what Washington perceived to be] a more stable and constructive leadership in Moscow.”⁷³ Given the scheming

⁷¹ Bundy Weekend Reading for Kennedy, July 19, 1963, NSF: M&M, box 318, Index of Weekend Papers, 7/63-11/63, JFKL.

⁷² Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, 168.

⁷³ Nancy B. Tucker, “US-China Relations Since 1945,” in Warren I. Cohen, *Pacific Passages* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 227. See also Leopold A. Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: American’s China Policy, 1949-1979*

nature of such a stratagem, one would be hard-pressed to find conclusive traces of it in the documentary record. Some evidence, however, does exist to enhance the plausibility of the Tucker-Kusnitz hypothesis. According to one mid-level State officer, the idea of magnifying the dimension of the Chinese enemy for domestic consumption appealed to movers and shakers as early as mid-1962. As that paper states, the discussion of the Domino Theory was related as much to the perceived psychology of the American voters as to the countries of Southeast Asia.⁷⁴

VII. Conclusion: Assessment of Two Decision-Making Models

A. The Bureaucratic Politics Model

Perhaps no other decision-making model has engendered as much attention, discussion and debate as the bureaucratic politics model largely developed by Allison and Halperin during the early 1970's. Indeed, Robert P. Haffa has declared that "Allison's analytic approach to decision-making theory has recently become one of the most widely disseminated concepts in all of social science."⁷⁵ One of the greatest problems associated with the use

(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), 106. Tucker and Kusnitz argue that the Eisenhower administration resorted to the same device during its later years. David A. Mayers is the first historian to offer the similar view about the Eisenhower administration. See David A. Mayers, *Cracking the Monolith: U.S. Policy against the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1955* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).

⁷⁴ R.W. Barnett Paper, "Foreign Policy and China," April 25, 1962, JCT Papers, box 15, General, 4/62-6/62.

⁷⁵ Quoted from Jerel Rosati, "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective," *World Politic.* (January 1981), 235.

of the bureaucratic politics model, however, has been the lack of information and detail about specific decision-making episodes.

The model has been criticized because the decision-making analysts must often rely upon incomplete data and unreliable information sources (personal memoirs of participants, newspaper accounts, interviews etc.). Important details, therefore, may be missing, forgotten or even consciously altered by participants. Given this lack of reliable data, some individuals complain that decision-making analysts are “imposing their theory on the data, rather than testing their theory on the basis of their data.”⁷⁶ The findings of this study would appear, to some extent, to support this criticism.

This work was based upon declassified US government documents. These documents are invaluable, as they provide much necessary primary source material helpful in determining the efficacy of decision-making models. In short, armed with this data, one may actually be able to determine how and why certain decisions were made. In these cases the bureaucratic politics model holds little explanatory power.

In sum, the two main hypotheses (B1 and B2) of the model did not characterize either decision-making process which culminated in the Kennedy administration’s policy toward the Sino-Soviet split. The policies advocated by the “players” in both exercises were not determined by their organizational interests or relative positions in the government, and the decisions ultimately reached were not the result of compromise.

B. The Rational Actor Model

⁷⁶ Dan Caldwell, “Bureaucratic Foreign Policy Making,” *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 21, No. 1. September-October 1977, 100.

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The rational actor model seeks an explanation of U.S. foreign policy from a political calculation of international affairs and domestic situation. Based on this calculation, the state actor defines what national interests are at stake and what the goal of U.S. policy should be.

The decisions made by the Kennedy administration's policy makers in this study can best be described as rational decisions best explained by the rational model. As with the student who takes a multiple choice exam, decision-makers appear to have considered options "A," "B," and "C," only to discover that the selection of any of these options would probably entail unacceptable losses. As a consequence, decision-maker chose to select option "D," which we could define as either "none of the above" or "all of the above." In some cases, the selection of option "D" may be the optimal or rational choice, as option "D" will either maintain the status quo (no losses or gains) or even result in a gain for American interest. In sum, the utility of option "D" (none of the above/ all of the above) is greater than the utility of options "A," "B," or "C" .

In this study, the selection of a clear and readily identifiable policy would have threatened and undermined American foreign policy goals and objectives. The table below highlights some of the unacceptable alternatives to the policies of no change, and helps to explain why decision-makers opted to select none of them.

Table: Options of Policies for Decision-Maker

Policies options	Sino-Soviet Split	Limited Test Ban Treaty
A	Exploiting the Split and side with the Soviet Union	Signing the LTBT
B	Side with the PRC	Not signing the LTBT
C	Use “Carrot and Stick” approach toward both the USSR and PRC	
D maintain the status quo	Do nothing	Do nothing

Source: by the author

The first column represents the policy alternatives of the U.S. policy for the Sino-Soviet split. In this case, American decision-makers are faced with three clear choices; they may (A) Exploiting the Split and Side with Soviet Union, (B) Side with the PRC or (C) Use “Carrot and Stick” approach toward both the USSR and the PRC. The Kennedy administration’s policy in this instance can be analyzed by dividing into two stages. In the first stage, lack of solid intelligent evidence about the nature of the split, the administration decided to do nothing (option “D”). In the second stage, however, Washington fully recognized the irreversibility of the split. The administration decided to play strategic triangular game and side with the Soviet (option “A”).

The Second column in Table 1 represents American policy toward the signing of the LTBT. The U.S. decision-makers have only two options, either (A) sign the LTBT or (B) not signing. Because the U.S. decided to play the strategic game, the choice was clear that the U.S. chose option “A,” in accordance with its new policy.

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The decision to go with option “D” holds several benefits for the decision-maker. It may be a temporary measure, adopted to buy time. In the case of U.S. policy for the Sino-Soviet split, the decision-maker has elected temporarily to postpone the selection of a clear policy. The Kennedy administration awaited more complete and accurate information to make the final decision.

At the point where a decision-maker decides there are no acceptable alternatives to “D” and none are likely to exist in the foreseeable future, one move from “calculated procrastination” to “calculated ambiguity.” In such cases, the decision-maker essentially has stopped searching for acceptable options, having concluded that none exist.

In addition to buying time, the selection of options “D” may hold other potential benefits. The decision-maker may initially choose “D” as a standing policy simply because all other options are unacceptable. In case such as this, he is not “playing for time,” but avoiding something worse. The decision toward the Sino-Soviet split is case in point.

Another potential benefit of option “D” is that it allows for some flexibility that might otherwise be lost; options remain open. If events change, another policy choice is possible. Option “D” also leaves the decision-maker with the flexibility to change policy, and it enables him to establish a linkage between his nation’s policy and the policies and/or action of other actors.

In sum, there is a variety of reasons why decision-makers, after systematically estimating and considering the expected values of possible alternatives, may ultimately decide that all options are

unacceptable and opt for maintaining the status quo. The analyses in this study demonstrate that all of the alternatives to maintaining the status quo held risks for American foreign policy goals and objectives. As a consequence, the value-maximizing option was “D,” maintaining the status quo. Therefore, the findings do confirm the two hypotheses A1 and A2.

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Playing the Soviet Card — The Analysis of the Kennedy Administration's Policy for the Sino-Soviet Split

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【 Abstract】

Throughout the Kennedy years, the Soviet Union and Communist China competed for influence over Communist nations in the Third World. Khrushchev faced domestic pressure to increase Soviet military spending and criticism from the Chinese for allegedly being soft against the West. PRC was also developing a nuclear weapons program despite Khrushchev's preference to keep Beijing under the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Sino-Soviet tension soon caused hostile rhetoric between the two nations and sporadic fighting along shared borders.

Initially, however, the Kennedy administration assumed a gingerly public approach toward the split, and did not seek an alignment with Moscow. This was due to uncertainty about the scope and endurance of Sino-Soviet friction. At the end of 1961, indicators of the deepening rift combined with the Thanksgiving Day reshuffle to increase the influence of those American watchers who pronounced

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the split profound. After the Sino-Indian war and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the administration was certain about the perpetuation of the split. By 1963, Kennedy recognized that Sino-Soviet tension meant there was a split in international communism, and so the Kennedy administration sought to play the strategic triangular game. The administration tried to use test ban treaty to prevent the Soviets from giving nuclear technology to Beijing. In this way, the Kennedy administration drove Moscow and Beijing further apart.

Key words : the Kennedy administration; the Sino-Soviet split;
strategic triangle; decision-making models